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Abstract. In this paper we focus on authentication and privacy as-
pects of an application scenario that utilizes mobile crowd sensing for
the beneﬁt of amusement park operators and their visitors. The scenario
involves a mobile app that gathers visitors’ demographic details, pref-
erences, and current location coordinates, and sends them to the park’s
sever for various analyses. These analyses assist the park operators to eﬃ-
ciently deploy their resources, estimate waiting times and queue lengths,
and understand the behavior of individual visitors and groups. The app
server also oﬀers visitors optimal recommendations on routes and attrac-
tions for an improved dynamic experience and minimized wait times. We
propose a practical usable solution we call an anonymous authentication
of visitors protocol that protects the privacy of visitors even while collect-
ing their details, preferences and location coordinates; deters adversaries
outside the park from sending in huge amounts of false data, which lead
to erroneous analyses and recommendations and bring down the app
server. We utilize queuing theory to analyze the performance of a typi-
cal app server receiving numerous simultaneous requests from visitors to
process a core function of our protocol.
Keywords: Mobile crowd sensing, Amusement park, Anonymous au-
thentication, False data, Partially blind signature scheme.
1 Introduction
Smart mobile devices allow users to download, install, and run mobile (soft-
ware) applications (apps) that allow users to receive locations based services.
For example, mobile apps use the Global Positioning System (GPS) sensor ex-
tensively to provide information speciﬁc to the users’ current location. For mobile
crowd sensing [12], [20], a mobile app periodically collects a device’s sensor data
from a large group of people and transmits them to the app server. Analyses at
the server can provide location speciﬁc information directly to individuals and
groups.
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Amusement and theme parks, such as Disneyland, Universal Studios, and
LEGOLAND, oﬀer a variety of attractions, including rides, shows, dining, and
other forms of entertainment. Since they attract a large number of visitors, the
major inconvenience faced by visitors is long wait times, and park operators are
always exploring and implementing ways and means to minimize/control queue
lengths and enhance visitor experiences.
1.1 Current Situation
Park operators have several options to minimize visitors’ wait times and to
improve their overall experience. In the following, we brieﬂy describe three most
common approaches, where visitors’ involvement is required.
Special/Express Pass Approach. Parks can sell special admission tickets, at
a premium which allow purchasers to bypass the regular lines and gain priority
entrance [22]. This approach may create a feeling of frustration when the special
pass holders bypass those visitors who are waiting in the regular lines for a long
time.
Timed Ticket Approach. The visitor inserts his/her admission ticket into a
machine (located near the attraction) that issues a timed ticket with the return
time window printed on it [9]. Now the visitor is free to enjoy the rest of the park
and need to reach the attraction within the return time window. Since visitors
cannot purchase such timed tickets, this approach gives any visitor inside the
park equal opportunity to pick up a timed ticket. Typically timed tickets are
issued in limited number; visitors must be able to physically reach the machine
before they are all issued; otherwise they need wait in the regular lines. At any
point of time, a visitor cannot possess more than one valid timed ticket and if
the visitor fails to reach the attraction around his/her return time window, the
timed ticket will be wasted. As a result this approach is neither scalable, ﬂexible
nor dynamic with respect to the total number of visitors and their movements
in the park.
Mobile App Approach. Some park operators deploy mobile apps [23], [18],
which display the map of the park, oﬀer directions, provide information about
promotions, shopping and dining options, and most importantly information
about various attractions and their wait times. Such apps push notiﬁcations
from the app server to the visitors’ smart mobile devices. They do not generally
aggregate the mobile crowd sensed data and visitors’ personal preferences, nor
analyze them in order to recommend optimal routes and attractions, for an
enhanced dynamic visitor experience and to minimize wait times.
1.2 Application Scenario
Building upon the mobile app approach, we envision an application scenario,
which is based on the mobile crowd sensing and would eliminate the drawbacks
of the previously described approaches and oﬀers other great beneﬁts to both
the park operators and their visitors.
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Visitor Alice downloads, installs and runs a mobile app developed by the park
operator. The mobile app prompts Alice to enter demographic details such as her
age, gender, nationality, height (used to determine access to certain attractions),
dietary restrictions and other health issues, as well as preferences for rides; must
go and must skip attractions, etc. The app would not ask for Personal Identifying
Information (PII) such as name, social security number, and address. The app
then sends these details and preferences to the app server managed by the park
operator. Henceforth, the app would also periodically collect Alice’s current GPS
location coordinates and send them to the app server, and Alice would receive
communications from the server.
Benefits to the Visitors. Based on Alice’s current location and her demo-
graphic details and preferences, the server would periodically and dynamically
calculate an updated personalized itinerary for Alice to visit various attractions
that minimize her wait times. Alice can follow the itinerary to visit an attrac-
tion during the recommended time slot, and tap her smart device or an RFID
enabled device at the entrance/exit of the attraction for validation. Incentives
(such as points that can be redeemed for gifts) can be used to encourage Alice
to follow the recommended route.
With this approach, visitors need not physically visit a machine to obtain a
return timed ticket. All visitors using the mobile app have equal opportunity to
receive personalized time slots and recommended routes. If the server analyzes
that a particular visitor, based on his/her current location cannot reach the
attraction within his/her recommended time slot, the server would dynamically
recalibrate new time slots for that visitor. Therefore this scenario is scalable,
dynamic, and certainly not wastage prone.
Benefits to the Park Operators. By dynamically analyzing the visitors’
crowd-sensed GPS data, the app server assists the park operators to manage
and deploy their resources eﬃciently, manage traﬃc ﬂows and congestion, ana-
lyze various key performance indices such as the queue information, and aver-
age/maximum wait times at each attraction, etc. Similarly by analyzing visitors’
demographic details, preferences and activities, the app server also assists park
operators to gain insight into the behavior of groups and individual visitors based
common preferences, and background characteristics. This then allows for new
approaches to meet visitor needs as well as dynamic optimal recommendations
and routes to improve their overall experience in the park.
2 Threats and Security Requirements
From our application scenario, we identiﬁed the following threats to privacy and
certain security requirements to alleviate these threats.
2.1 Threats
Visitor Privacy Violation. In our application scenario the mobile app gath-
ers visitors’ demographic details, preferences and current location coordinates;
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therefore, we have to make sure that all these details do not reveal and cannot be
linked to the true identities of the visitors; otherwise the app server or a hacker
who has hacked into the app server, can generate detailed proﬁles of the visitors,
their buying interests, track all their activities and current locations and carry
out malicious acts such as identity fraud, stalking, and sending spam adverts.
False Data. Adversaries outside the park, for various malicious reasons (extor-
tion, blackmail) can attempt to emulate the mobile app in a computer and create
an unlimited number of fake virtual visitors with their location coordinates in-
side the park. The app sever might unsuspectingly consider all these fake virtual
visitors to be actual visitors inside the park. Sending huge amounts of such false
data to the app server would result in erroneous analyses and recommendations
that could confuse and frustrate the visitors and also overwhelm, degrade and
eventually bring down the server.
Greedy Visitors. Greedy park visitors could attempt to tamper with their
smart mobile devices [15], to send false location coordinates in order to cheat
the process, obtain unfair preferential treatment, rewards, and earlier time slots
for the attractions of their choice.
Man-In-Middle-Attacks. The channel between the mobile app and the app
server is potentially prone to eavesdropping, data capture, and data corruption
by hackers. Since the channel is carrying potentially sensitive data, such attacks
would violate visitors’ privacy and lead to erroneous analyses at server.
2.2 Security Requirements
Use of Pseudonyms. Visitors must interact with the app server using
pseudonyms to decouple visitors’ data from their true identities.
Visitor Authentication. To prevent adversaries outside the park from supply-
ing large volume of false data, the app server needs to verify whether the data
it receives is indeed from a visitor inside the park. To accomplish this, the app
server must authenticate the visitors inside the park and receive data from only
such authenticated visitors.
Data Auditing. The app server needs to audit the data it receives in order to
detect any anomalies or false data from greedy visitors.
Secure Communication Channel. The channel between the mobile app and
the app server must be secure enough to provide app server authentication to
the mobile app, and data protection and integrity for communications.
3 Proposed Anonymous Authentication of Visitors
(AAV) Protocol
Nothing would stop an adversary outside the park from supplying a large volume
of false data. Therefore, we need to authenticate the information reported by
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a visitor inside the park without divulging the visitor’ identity. In this paper
we apply the cryptographic notion of anonymous authentication: authenticating
the visitor without revealing his/her identity. The fundamental idea here is to
interact with the visitor using a pseudonym instead of his/her true identity.
3.1 Naive Approaches
One naive approach would be to use the admission ticket ID as the visitor’s
pseudonym. The mobile app would send to the app server, the visitors’ demo-
graphic details, preferences, and current location coordinates referring the ticket
ID. Linking these details to the ticket ID proves that the visitor is genuine and is
indeed inside the park. The adversary must purchase a suﬃciently large number
of valid admission tickets to launch a successful attack, but this would not be
economical as the tickets are very expensive. This naive approach would greatly
limit the adversary’s power; however it does not protect the privacy of the vis-
itor. A vast majority of the visitors buy their tickets using their credit cards.
In which case the issued ticket IDs are recorded and linked to the credit card,
which is in turn linked to the true identity of the visitor. Therefore, this naive
approach does not truly address the requirement of anonymous authentication.
A second naive approach is for the app server to accept communications that
come only through the Wi-Fi network of the park. Once again here, without
authentication, nothing would prevent the adversary to use the park’s Wi-Fi
network to create unlimited number of fake virtual visitors. Furthermore, most
of the visitors may hesitate using an unsecured open Wi-Fi network and instead
prefer to use their own 3G/4G network.
3.2 Background
Our proposed AAV protocol utilizes pseudonyms and partially blind signature
scheme.
Blind Signature. In 1982, David Chaum proposed a new cryptographic primi-
tive called the blind signature [5], which could be used as a primer tool to design
electronic payment and electronic voting schemes with user privacy-protection
in mind. Blind signature is a special kind of digital signature [17], which allows
users to get signatures on their messages from authorized entities/signature is-
suers (e.g. banks, trusted third parties) without revealing the message contents
to the authorized entity. Furthermore, if malicious signature issuers and veriﬁers
(e.g. service providers, merchants) collude, they cannot discover the real identity
of the user who actually holds the signatures.
Partially Blind Signature. Blind signatures provide total privacy for users by
fully hiding messages (to be signed) from the signer. This property is not desired
from the signer’s point of view, because he is responsible for his signatures and
he needs to know what he would be signing on. To achieve a solution acceptable
for both the signer and users, Abe and Fujisaki proposed the idea of partially
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blind signature [1], which was later formally proved by Abe and Okamato [2].
A partially blind signature scheme has two portions: one portion consists of the
message that is hidden by the user (as in blind signature scheme) and in the
other portion, the signer can explicitly embed necessary information such as
issuing date, expiry date, signer’s identity etc. Users should be made aware of
the information that the signer wishes to embed into the signature. Users must
also be able to verify that only the agreed-upon information has been embedded
by the signer; otherwise the signer may secretly embed undisclosed information
into the signature that could reveal the true identity of the users at a later stage.
3.3 AAV Protocol Description
The AAV protocol is executed in two phases: “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing
Phase”, followed by the “Subsequent Interaction Phase”.
In the “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”, Alice’s mobile app generates a
pseudonym P and utilizes the partially blind signature scheme to hide P in a
blinded message B. The mobile app then sends the ticket ID along with B to
the app server. The app server veriﬁes the validity of ticket ID, and inputs an
expiry date while digitally signing B. As a result the app server has no clue
about Alice’s pseudonym and cannot link the future communications from this
pseudonym to Alice. The mobile app would unblind the signature on B, in order
to recover the signature S to the bare pseudonym P , thus making S the certiﬁed
pseudonym by the app server.
In the “Subsequent Interaction Phase”, the mobile app no longer uses the
ticket ID, instead it uses the P and the S to send Alice’s demographic details,
preferences, current location coordinates. Since the signature on B from the
app server has been unblinded to the bare pseudonym P , the app server can
easily verify whether the pseudonym P sent by the mobile app matches with the
pseudonym signed in the signature S and also whether it is within the expiry
date. As a result the app server can make sure that it is communicating with a
certiﬁed pseudonym/visitor inside the park.
Setup.We construct our protocol using the RSA-based partially blind signature
scheme proposed by Abe and Fujisaki [1]. The mobile app and the app server
share a secure one-way hash function h(.) whose length is k bits. The app server
executes RSA function as follows: N is a product of two large primes p and q. N
satisﬁes Si  λ for all prime Si(3 ≤ Si ≤ 2k − 1), where λ is the LCM of (p− 1)
and (q − 1). The prime e is an RSA public component, which is larger than or
equal to 2k − 1. The corresponding private key is d given by ed = 1modλ. The
mobile app has the knowledge of e and N .
It is a known fact that a one day admission ticket would expire by the end
of that day the visitor enters the park and a two day admission ticket would
expire by the end of the second day of the visitor’s visit to the park. Therefore,
we assume that both the mobile app and the app server have the knowledge of
the expiry date of an admission ticket. Let x be the expiry date of the admission
ticket, whose length is k−2 bits and both the mobile app and the app server are
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capable of calculating: τ(x) = 2k−1 + 2h(x) + 1. τ(x) is a formatting function
designed to keep its domain in 2k−1 < τ(x) < 2k so that τ(xi) does not divide
τ(xj) where i = j. Also, it is designed to produce odd numbers only so that it
becomes relatively prime with λ.
The mobile app can also generate pseudonyms of length k bits and the com-
munication channel between the mobile app and the app server is secured via
the standard HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) protocol [16].
Certified Pseudonym Issuing Phase depicted in the Fig.1 is self explana-
tory; however, we elaborate some of the steps here. Step 3 executes the blinding
procedure of the partially blind signature scheme, which hides P in B. No one
else other than the mobile app knows the value of P , i.e., the blinded message
B is statistically or perfectly indistinguishable from P as long as blinding factor
R is not revealed. Step 6 validates whether tktid is a valid unused ticket and
has not been previously used to generate a partially blind signature. In Step 3,
eτ(x) has become the public key that contains the common information between
the mobile app and the app server, i.e., the expiry date. Therefore, in step 7,
the app server calculates the corresponding private key dx. Step 8 executes the
Alice’s Secure Channel Park’s
Mobile App HTTPS App Server
Hash function: h(.) Hash function: h(.)
Large primes: p, q; N = pq
λ = LCM(p− 1, q − 1)
ed = 1modλ
Server’s public key: e,N Private key: d,N
Ticket’s expiry date: x Ticket’s expiry date: x
τ (x) = 2k−1 + 2h(x) + 1 τ (x) = 2k−1 + 2h(x) + 1
1. Scan ticket barcode: tktid
2. Generate pseudonym: P
3. Randomly choose a blind factor: R ∈ Z∗N
4. blind(P): B = h(P )Reτ(x)modN
5. (tktid,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
6. Validate: tktid
7. Calculate private key: dx = 1/eτ (x)modλ(N)
8. ParBlindSign(B): Φ = BdxmodN
9. (Φ)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
10. unblind(Φ): S = Φ/R ≡ P dxmodN
11. Verify: S using eτ (x)
Fig. 1. Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase of AAV Protocol
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signing procedure of the partially blind signature scheme to generate the blinded
signature Φ. Step 10 executes the unblinding procedure of the partially blind sig-
nature scheme on Φ, which unblinds B to reveal P in the signature S. From here
on S certiﬁes the pseudonym P .
Subsequent Interaction Phase (Fig.2). In this phase, the mobile app sends
the visitor’s demographic details and preferences (DetPre), and current GPS
coordinates (Gps) using the S, P, x. The app server computes h(P ) and veriﬁes
the signature on S using x, h(P ), dx, this validates that P has been indeed cer-
tiﬁed in S. With P being the reference index in the database, the app server
records and analyzes the DetPre, and the periodic (T ime : Gps) data, and
Rewards calculations. The server would now keep track and communicate with
the mobile app using this P . The mobile app would receive the optimal route
(Route), and the dynamically calibrated personalized time slots (TSlots) for
various attractions (Attrs) in the park, as well as Rewards.
Alice’s Secure Channel Park’s
Mobile App HTTPS App Server
1. Enter demographic details and preferences: DetPre
2. Obtain current GPS location: Gps
3. Retrieve: {S, P, x}
4. ({S, P, x}, DetPre,Gps)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
5. Verify: S using x, h(P ), dx and validate: P
6. Store and analyze:
p : DetPre
p : (T ime1 : Gps1, · · · , T imen : Gpsn)
7. Compute and Store:
p : Route
p : (Attr1 : TSlot1, · · · , Attrn : TSlotn)
p : Rewards
8. (Route,Attrs : TSlots,Rewards)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
9. View:
Optimal Route
Attr1 : TSlot1, · · · , Attrn : TSlotn
Rewards
Fig. 2. Subsequent Interaction Phase of AAV Protocol
3.4 Anonymous Authentication of a Group
In our application scenario, the app server would assist the park operators to
understand the behavior of groups moving together by constantly analyzing
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the visitors’ demographic details, preferences and activities; however, our AAV
protocol is only applicable to individual visitors. Therefore, we extend the AAV
protocol to accommodate anonymous authentication of a group. The basic idea
here is that the pseudonyms of individual members of a group would all be linked
to a single common group pseudonym. With this approach the app server can
carry out behavioral analysis of individual members of a group based on their
individual unique pseudonyms and also the behavioral analysis of the entire
group based on their single common group pseudonym.
We can slightly modify the “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”, so that
the head/leader of the group’s mobile app would generate two pseudonyms; one
representing the group pseudonym (GP ) and the second representing his/her
own individual pseudonym (P ). Both the GP and P , would be hidden in the
blinded message B. The head of the group would then inform the rest of the
group members about the group pseudonym, e.g., via email. The rest of the group
members’ mobile apps would then include this GP along with their individual
pseudonyms during their “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”. Finally, during
the “Subsequent Interaction Phase”, the app server would record both the group
pseudonym and the individual pseudonyms.
4 Security Analysis
This section provides security analysis of our AAV protocol with respect to the
threats described in section 2.
4.1 Use of Pseudonyms to Protect Visitors’ Privacy
Our proposed AAV protocol successfully utilizes pseudonyms to decouple visi-
tors’ data from their true identities. The app server has no role in generating
the pseudonyms for the visitors. The blinding procedure of the partially blind
signature scheme does not reveal the visitor’s pseudonym to the app server, yet
the scheme allows us to obtain the signature of the app server on the pseudonym.
The app server cannot link the pseudonym to neither the ticket ID nor the credit
card used to purchase the ticket. Both the mobile app and the app server can
independently produce x, τ(x), and eτ(x); therefore the mobile app can precisely
verify (step 11 of the “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”) that apart from the
expiry date x, the app server has not included any hidden message to distinguish
the transaction later.
Restricted Privacy. Our AAV protocol provides only restricted privacy, but
not complete visitor anonymity and unlinkability. Our application scenario re-
quires that the visitor be tracked with a particular pseudonym, so that his/her
preferences and current GPS location data can be gathered, analysed, and used
to recommend optimal route, award rewards, and send dynamically calibrated
personalized time windows for various attractions in the park.
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Physical Layer Anonymity. Even though we use the AAV protocol, visitors
may be tracked based on their smart device’s MAC (Media Access Control)
address, which is a unique ﬁxed identiﬁer assigned to network interfaces for
communications on the physical network. However, if the visitor is using the
device’s 3G/4G network to communicate with the app server, the operator of
the 3G/4G network would assign a diﬀerent IP address each time a connection
is made and the MAC address is made known only to the operator. The app
server would only know the dynamic IP address, which cannot be used to track
the device.
On the other hand if the visitor is using the free Wi-Fi network provided
by the park operator, there are chances that the app server may retrieve and
store the MAC addresses oﬀ the Wi-Fi access points. This situation is very
rare and would require considerable amount of resources on the part of the app
server to record the MAC address of every communication. However, there are
ways to circumvent this problem; the visitor may choose to communicate with
the app server through anonymity networks like the mix network [11], and Tor
onion routing network [21]. Such networks direct user’s internet traﬃc through
a worldwide volunteer network of servers to conceal a user’s location or guard
against network surveillance or traﬃc analysis. There exists an open source client
for the Tor network on Android mobile devices called the “Orbot” [19].
4.2 Visitor Authentication to Deter False Data from Adversaries
Outside the Park
Our AAV protocol achieves anonymous authentication, whereby the app server
accepts data only from pseudonyms that have been certiﬁed during the “Certi-
ﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”. The function τ(x) prevents a visitor to obtain
multiple signatures on the same pseudonym with diﬀerent expiry dates [1]. The
h(P ) in the step 4: blind(P): B = h(P )Reτ(x)modN , prevents two visitors with
valid certiﬁed pseudonyms to collude and forge a new valid certiﬁed pseudonym.
Uniqueness of Ticket ID. In our “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase” we
depend on the ticket ID to be unique and non-sequential. The app server veriﬁes
whether the ticket ID is un-used, un-expired, and was not previously used to
obtain the partially blind signature. But, if the park operators do not issue
unique and non-sequential tickets, any one could produce and sell fake tickets
and can also misuse our protocol. It is a problematic situation for both the park
operators and for our protocol. In cases where the ticket ID is already on the
ticket and not uniquely generated and printed at the time of issuing, we can
expect sequential IDs. We suggest that the park operators generate and print
another unique number (for example the current date and time) on every ticket
at the time of issuing. In such a scenario, the mobile app would prompt the
visitor to type in that unique number and send it along with the (tktid, B), step
5 of “Certiﬁed Pseudonym Issuing Phase”. This approach would ensure that we
are dealing with unique and non-sequential ticket IDs.
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4.3 Data Auditing: Heuristics, Thresholds, and Revocation to
Deter Greedy Visitors
Following the approach of [15], which used heuristics to detect fake-location
attacks against location-based services, we suggest that the app server would
formulate and put in place certain heuristics such as calculating the time elapsed
between the visitors’ previous location and the current location. If this time
matches with the average time taken by other visitors to commute between the
same two locations, then the data is considered legitimate. Minimum threshold
values must also be put in place, to detect false data. Whenever the app server
identiﬁes a particular pseudonym sending in data that does not match these
heuristics and threshold values, it could be a greedy visitor, in which case the
app server can immediately black list that particular certiﬁed pseudonym and
deny all future communications.
4.4 Secure Channel to Counter Man-in-the-middle Attacks
In our AAV protocol, the communication channel between the mobile app and
app server is secured using the standard HTTPS protocol [16]. The HTTPS
authenticates the app server, and guarantees conﬁdentiality and integrity for
the data communicated between the mobile app and app server. The developers
of the mobile app must carefully implement the HTTPS protocol; recent works
[10], [13], have shown that improper implementations and over looking of various
critical settings of HTTPS have resulted in complete breakdown of certiﬁcate
veriﬁcation, which can lead to successful man-in-the-middle attacks.
5 Related Work
There exist other cryptographic solutions such as the group signature schemes
[7], and anonymous credential schemes [6], [8]. These schemes allow a member
of a group to sign on a message on behalf of the group. The veriﬁer of the signed
message can prove that the message has come from the group, but cannot deduce
the true identity of the group member who signed the message. At the outset
these schemes seem suitable, but for the following reasons they are not practical
for our application scenario. These schemes require all the visitors in the park
to have a public and private key pair. They also require a group manager to add
members into the group, issue group public key and to certify the groupmembers’
credentials. The group manager, if the need arises, can also trace and identify
the member who signed a particular message. In our application scenario, the
visitors enter the park in huge numbers in an unpredictable manner; we cannot
expect the visitors to generate public and private key pairs; it is impossible
for the visitors to establish a group manager among themselves and to execute
complex operations of these signature schemes. The park operator cannot be a
group manager, in which case the true identities of the visitors are revealed.
There also exist anonymous e-token schemes [4], where an user is initially
issued a certain number of certiﬁed pseudonyms or anonymous e-tokens by the
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server. At a later phase, every time the user communicates with the server,
he/she uses a diﬀerent anonymous e-token. This scheme does not reveal the true
identity of the user, yet the server can conﬁrm if the data has come from an
authorized user possessing certiﬁed anonymous e-token. As mentioned in our
security analysis section—Restricted Privacy—this scheme is also not practical
for our application scenario because it provides complete anonymity and unlink-
ability of pseudonyms.
6 App Server Performance Results
In our proposed AAV protocol, the app server executes two core cryptographic
procedures; the “partially blind signing procedure” (during the Certiﬁed
Pseudonym Issuing Phase) and the “signature veriﬁcation procedure” (during
the Subsequent Communication Phase). Similar to the typical RSA-based sign-
ing and signature veriﬁcation procedures [17]; both the RSA-based partially
blind signing and signature veriﬁcation procedures [1] include one hash opera-
tion and one exponentiation operation. We relied on [24] for the speed bench-
marks of some of the most commonly used cryptographic algorithms. A 1024
bit RSA-based signing procedure and signature veriﬁcation procedures take 0.67
milliseconds (ms) and 0.04 ms respectively, when executed on an AMD Opteron
8354, 2.2 GHz processor under Linux. We can assume that a 1024 RSA-based
partially blind signing procedure and signature veriﬁcation procedures would not
take more than 0.67 ms and 0.04 ms respectively, when executed on an AMD
Opteron 8354, 2.2 GHz processor under Linux.
Amusement parks attract large numbers of visitors. For example, the Magic
Kingdom at Walt Disney World Resort, Florida, USA is the largest amusement
park worldwide in order of annual attendance [3]; 17 million visitors in the
year 2011, averaging 46,000 visitors a day. As a result, thousands of visitors’
mobile apps would concurrently access the app server. Since a 1024 bit RSA-
based partially blind signing procedure requires longer time (0.67 ms), when
compared to the signature veriﬁcation procedure (0.04 ms), we are particularly
interested in the number of simultaneous partially blind signing requests that
could be handled by an app server. Therefore we applied queuing theory [14] to
analyze the performance of the app server by predicting its response times while
executing the 1024 bit RSA-based partially blind signing procedure.
In queuing theory, a system consists of a single queue of jobs submitted to one
or more servers. We used the stochastic M/M/C queuing model, where the M
represents the Markov or memory less or exponential nature of the job arrival
and job service rates, and C is the number of servers attached to the queue.
Initially we considered 1 app server, i.e., M/M/1 queuing model. A single server
can process approximately 1,492 partially blind signing requests per second at
the rate of 0.67 ms per request. We subjected this M/M/1 queuing model with
increasing number of requests per second and calculated the respective server’s
average response time. The average response time is the sum of the average
amount of time that it takes a server to process such a request, and the average
amount of time a request spends in the queue.
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Fig. 4. Average Response Time of App Server with M/M/3 Queuing Model
Fig.3 depicts the chart of server’s average response time with respect to the
increasing number of requests per second. It shows that as the number of requests
per second gets close to 1,492, the app sever becomes unstable, exponentially
reaching: maximum utilization capacity and maximum number of requests that
can be processed and are waiting in the queue, leading to a dead lock, and
ﬁnally the average response time reaching one second per request, frustrating
the visitors of the park. Fig.3 also points to the fact that the arrival rate of
1,000 requests per second allows the app server to be stable and process all
the requests eﬃciently with an average response time of just 2 ms. However,
considering the huge number of visitors in the park, we estimate that at least
3,000 (partially blind signing) requests per second must be processed by the app
server. Therefore, we must increase the number of app servers, i.e., the value of
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C in the M/M/C queuing model. Our calculations as depicted via the chart in
Fig.4 show that the M/M/3 queuing model, where a single queue of requests is
now handled by 3 app servers, can eﬃciently process 3,000 requests per second,
with an average response time of just 1 ms.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the authentication and privacy aspects of an appli-
cation scenario that utilizes mobile crowd sensing for the beneﬁt of amusement
park operators and their visitors. We proposed a simple and practical anony-
mous authentication of visitors protocol that utilizes pseudonyms and partially
blind signature scheme. The protocol protects the privacy of the visitors while
authenticating them to the park’s server and also prevents adversaries outside
the park from bombarding the server with huge amounts of false data. We have
utilized M/M/C queuing model to analyze the server performance while receiv-
ing a large number of simultaneous partially blind signing requests (per second)
from the visitors and recommended a minimum of 3 servers to handle 3,000
such requests per second for an optimal server response time. We oﬀered several
security discussions that need to be considered while deploying the application
scenario. In fact, the contributions of this paper would be applicable to other
types of similar application scenarios that are based on mobile crowd sensing
and incentivizing the visitors.
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